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Introduction 
 
The Sustainable Development Goals call for all children to complete “quality 
primary and secondary education” by 2030 (United Nations, 2015). This lofty goal 
expands on the previous targets set for 2015, now including not only primary but also 
secondary completion and aspirations for quality education. Low and middle-income 
countries have made important strides toward reaching the 2015 targets, which focused 
on access and completion. Meeting the expanded goals of secondary completion and 
quality will require building on the lessons learned from prior policies, especially the 
elimination of school fees not only at primary levels but also among earlier adopters at 
secondary level. Uganda’s decision to eliminate school fees in secondary schools in 2007, 
the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to do so, presents an opportunity to learn from the 
set of policies it implemented to expand secondary school access.  
The Ugandan government anticipated a large increase in demand for secondary 
school when it decided to eliminate school fees from most public schools. In order to 
accommodate the large increase in students, this country adopted three policies: 
constructing new public schools or classrooms in under-served areas; allowing over-
subscribed public schools to implement double-shifts; and inviting low-fee private 
schools to provide publicly-funded education. This study builds on an evaluation of the 
impact of the latter, a public-private partnership (PPP) that has resulted in nearly 900 
private secondary schools providing education to students subsidized by the government 
(Ministry of Education and Sports, 2013a). The PPP program in Uganda offered private 
schools an opportunity to enroll eligible students and receive a grant from the 
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government based on enrollment, provided students were not charged school fees1. 
Understanding the effects of this policy on low-fee private schools and students can serve 
to inform policymakers in Uganda as well as in other countries in the region as they take 
measures to increase access to quality secondary school education.  
A previously conducted quantitative evaluation of the PPP assessed the impact of 
the policy on access and student learning, as well as three potential mechanisms through 
which the PPP was anticipated to function. Results indicated that private schools 
participating in the program experienced large increases in enrollment and that, after 18 
months, students who attended these schools performed better on average than their peers 
in similar private schools who were not part of the program. Importantly, the evaluation 
found that the most likely mechanism that explained the difference in student test scores 
was a difference in the characteristics of students enrolled, rather than a change in school 
management or educational inputs. Importantly, however, the quantitative study did not 
exclude other causal mechanisms to explain student gains.  
The current study explores whether head teacher and parental perceptions were 
consistent with these quantitative findings and uncovers other mechanisms that could 
explain student learning gains. The findings from the qualitative study are consistent with 
the quantitative study, confirming an increase in learning opportunities for students from 
relatively lower-income backgrounds, as well as an opportunity for low-fee private 
schools to enroll students with higher performance at primary school. In addition, the 
study found that the program led to an increase of continuation of education for students 
                                                 
1 In order to be eligible, students need to pass the national Primary Leaving Exam with a maximum of 28 
points and cannot repeat a grade. While school fees are not charged to government-subsidized students, 
private schools can require funds for additional requirements, such as uniform, food or teaching materials.  
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and additional forms of support to teachers. These mechanisms could partially explain 
higher student achievement. These findings present important factors to consider as 
policymakers propose and implement strategies to expand secondary education. The 
paper is structured as follows. The first section provides an overview of the context, as 
well as a review of literature on public-private partnerships in education and the 
mechanisms explored in this study. I then describe the mixed-methods approach used to 
answer the research questions. Finally, I report findings and discuss policy implications 
for low and middle-income countries aiming to increase secondary school completion.  
Literature Review and Conceptual Framework 
 
Access to Education 
In its formulation of the Millennium Development Goals, the international 
community explicitly aimed to achieve universal primary education by 2015 (United 
Nations, 2013). In the last two decades, there has indeed been a massive expansion of 
access to primary school in low and middle-income countries. To achieve this, 
governments adopted a range of strategies, including eliminating school fees, school 
feeding programs and conditional cash transfers to increase demand, as well as supply-
side interventions through school construction and partnerships with the private sector 
(UNESCO, 2015). The sudden elimination of school fees in a small set of countries in the 
mid-nineties led to “regional political momentum” for other countries to follow suit 
(p.85, UNESCO, 2015).  
As a result of these policies, primary school completion increased in most 
countries, in some cases dramatically. In 2011, approximately 57 million children were 
out of school, compared to 102 million in 2000, despite an overall increase in the global 
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population (UN, 2013). However, progress has been unequal with large variations in the 
primary school completion rates between low-income countries and the rest of the world 
and, within countries, between higher and lower income families (UNESCO, 2015). In 
addition, maintaining quality instruction and preventing drop outs have been two major 
challenges following the rapid expansion of primary school systems. Completion of 
primary school in low-income countries reached 51% from 2008 to 2014, compared with 
84% and 92% in lower middle income and upper middle income countries respectively 
(UNESCO, 2016). These disparities persist throughout the system; countries in these 
income categories reached 27%, 68% and 79% completion at secondary level, 
respectively, over the same period. Differences in completion rates across countries exist 
alongside within-country inequalities. In Uganda, for example, young people from the 
poorest households averaged fewer than 5 years of education, compared with 
approximately 10 years for those from the richest households (UNESCO, 2016).  
In 2007, Uganda abolished fees for secondary schools through its Universal 
Secondary Education (USE) policy, the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to do so 
(Chapman, Burton, & Werner, 2010). This policy was introduced gradually through a 
phased-in approach over four years, and students’ eligibility was contingent on two 
criteria: not having repeated a grade and passing the Primary Leaving Exam (PLE) with a 
maximum of 28 points2. Under USE, enrollment in secondary school increased from 
approximately 700,000 to 1,080,000 students (54% increase) between 2006 and 2010; the 
transition rate from primary to secondary school also increased by 20 percentage (UIS, 
2016). 
                                                 
2 The PLE score is a composite of four assessments and scored such that 4 is the lowest and best possible 
score. 
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Given the large increase in access to primary school and moderate increase in 
completion, demand for secondary school has soared in many countries. This increase in 
demand, along with policies and programs aimed at reaching the newly-formulated SDGs 
on education foreshadow patterns of rapid expansions of secondary school similar to 
those described above in the primary sector. Ghana’s newly elected president, for 
instance, recently announced the abolishing of all fees for public secondary school 
starting in the 2017-2018 school year (Sackey, 2017). These policies are likely to have 
consequences similar to USE in Uganda for students and schools impacted.  
 
Private Schools and Partnerships in Education 
The share of enrollment in private schools in low-income countries doubled from 
11% to 22% between 1990 and 2010 while growing from 8% to 12% in middle-income 
countries (Baum, Lewis, Lusk-Stover, & Patrinos, 2014). This expansion has largely 
taken place at the primary level, and has been driven by students from lower income 
families’ choice of small private or community schools that charge low fees3. For 
example, in the capital city of Bihar state in India, a recent survey found that close to 
80% of schools were private, and 70% of those were low-fee schools (Rangaraju, Tooley, 
& Dixon, 2012). The growth in low-fee private schools has contributed to the overall 
increase in access to education at the primary level, but whether this increase contributes 
to reduce inequities remains contentious.  
Private schools expansion has served to increase access to education for 
underserved populations in a range of countries including Kenya, Ghana, Pakistan and 
                                                 
3 The literature uses several terms for these schools, such as low-cost, low-fee, community schools. In this 
paper, I use the term ‘low-fee private schools’ consistent with Srivastava (2013).  
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India (Barrera-Osorio, Blakeslee, Hoover, Linden, & Raju, 2011; Tooley & Dixon, 
2005). In these contexts, communities where low-fee private schools open, some children 
gain access to educational opportunities. For example, Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja (2008) 
show that boys and girls from four provinces in Pakistan living in settlements with 
private schools have enrollment rates 16 and 24 percentage points higher respectively. 
However, private schools do not tend to open in the most vulnerable communities. 
Andrabi et al. (2008) document that private schools in the four provinces studied open in 
larger settlements, where communities are relatively wealthier and have higher levels of 
literacy. Low-fee private schools across contexts usually fail to reach the most 
disadvantaged communities, and when they do, they are not affordable for the most 
vulnerable in these communities (Srivastava, 2013). Further, the expansion of private 
schools has clearly contributed to the increase in access to education, but the impact on 
quality of provision lacks strong evidence (Day Ashley et al., 2014). 
 While the private school expansion has been driven in part by entrepreneurs, 
governments in low and middle-income countries have also contributed to this increase 
through partnerships with private schools aimed at increasing capacity for expansion of 
access to education. Public-private partnerships (PPPs) in education take several different 
forms, including vouchers given to families and contracting out education services to 
private providers (Patrinos, Barrera-Osorio, & Guáqueta, 2009). Proponents of PPPs 
point to several potential advantages of partnerships. First, partnering with existing 
private schools allows for an expansion of access in a more cost-effective way than 
building new schools (Barrera-Osorio & Raju, 2011; Patrinos et al., 2009). Private 
schools in settings where families are not always able to pay fees may not make the 
7 
 
optimal investment because of the uncertainty of income stream. The risk aversion, 
thought to be common in private actors (Werner, 2008), could be mitigated by reliable 
streams of funding provided from the government through a PPP. In addition, private 
schools are thought to have more flexibility than public administrations to innovate, 
which could lead to an increase in quality, though this point has been contested (Verger, 
BonaL, & Zancajo, 2016). Finally, private schools can be held accountable by parents 
more directly, suggesting they should have to provide higher quality education in order to 
retain students. Taken together, these factors present PPPs as an opportunity to increase 
access to quality instruction, if proper quality assurance mechanisms are in place (Baum 
et al., 2014; Patrinos et al., 2009). 
As part of USE, the government of Uganda introduced a partnership with low-fee 
private schools in areas where government capacity to absorb new students was 
particularly low. The explicit goal of the PPP was to temporarily support the expansion of 
USE while government increased its capacity. Partnerships are regulated by a 
memorandum of understanding between schools and the Ministry of Education and 
Sports (MoES). Under this agreement, the MoES commits to transferring 47,000 UGX4 
per term per student eligible, and schools are required to abide by a set of regulations. 
These responsibilities include ensuring proper accountability of the funds, using the 
money for “teaching and learning”, employing qualified teachers and staff, having a 
Board of Governors (BOG) oversee the management of the school, and not charging 
school fees to eligible students5. By 2013, there were over 1800 secondary schools 
                                                 
4 In 2007, this was equivalent to $27.40. In 2017, this amounts to approximately $13.20. 
5 The MoU includes 12 responsibilities of the school: (i) Providing for the welfare and discipline of the 
students. (ii) Ensuring proper accountability of all disbursed funds. (iii) Ensuring that students admitted are 
eligible. (iv) Ensuring monies are used for teaching and learning. (v) Ensuring school has qualified head 
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participating in USE, 48% of which were private schools taking part in the PPP (Ministry 
of Education and Sports, 2013b). 
Evaluations of the impact of PPPs on student learning have found mixed results, 
with some evaluations findings positive outcomes for participants (Wössmann, 2006; 
Chakrabarti and Peterson, 2009 cited in Verger et al., 2016), others no impact (Barrow & 
Rouse, 2008). Further, positive gains found in some studies could have been at the 
expense of students who did not benefit from the program and stayed in the public 
schools (Kremer & Holla, 2009). Overall, evidence for the “private school effect” on 
student learning remains weak (Day Ashley et al., 2014). 
 
Mechanisms of PPP Effects on Student Learning Schools  
 The previous quantitative evaluation of PPP in Uganda proposed three 
mechanisms to explain changes in student learning: school governance, change in 
financial investments, and change in student composition (Barrera-Osorio, de Galbert, 
Habyarimana, & Sabarwal, 2016). Partnering with the government could lead to changes 
in school governance in two distinct ways. Under a PPP, schools relinquish part of their 
autonomy, which could negatively affect their service provision if autonomy is key to 
ensuring more effective management. In contrast, regulations imposed by government 
could lead to schools implementing more effective or representative governance 
structures. In Uganda, while all private schools are required to register with the 
                                                 
teacher. (vi) Ensuring that qualified staff is in place to deliver the curriculum. (vii) A functional BOG is in 
place. (viii) Ensuring proper bookkeeping including a student register. (ix) Ensuring the institution meets 
the basic requirements and minimum standards. (x) Ensuring class size is as recommended under USE 
guidelines of 60 students per stream. (xi) Ensuring regular statistical returns to the MoES. (xii) Declaring 
the number of students to benefit from the Bursary. For an example of the MoU, see Brans (2011).  
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government, schools applying to the PPP had to provide evidence of having complied 
with MoES regulations. 
Government subsidies could also affect low-fee private school investment 
decisions. First, a partnership can lead to an increase in overall budget through the 
government grant. This increase in budget can lead to changes in investments such as an 
increase in teacher compensation or purchase of learning materials. Supporting teachers 
in these ways could prove a lever in improving quality. For example, teacher absenteeism 
is an important problem in low and middle-income countries (Chaudhury, Hammer, 
Kremer, Muralidharan, & Rogers, 2006), especially in rural areas (Mulkeen, 2005). 
Teacher salaries are generally low, causing many to search for additional employment 
through tutoring, farming, or teaching in more than one school as was found for Science 
teachers in Uganda (Bennell & Akyeampong, 2007; Urwick & Kisa, 2014). Better 
support for teachers through a PPP could therefore reduce absenteeism and improve 
instruction.  
 Partnerships between private schools and government could also affect the 
composition of students enrolled. Increasing school choice for parents could lead to 
increased socio-economic segregation if students and parents who are better prepared and 
have more information can select better schools. Similarly, if schools can select the 
students they accept through the partnerships programs, schools could select higher 
achieving students and leave public schools or non-participating private schools with 
lower performing students, as was seen in Chile (Hsieh & Urquiola, 2006; Verger et al., 
2016).  
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 In addition to the three mechanisms tested in the quantitative study, this paper 
explores whether the program’s impact on students could have led to increased learning. 
Students enrolled in private schools under a government sponsorship could benefit in 
several ways. First, they could benefit from the reduced financial pressure. While the 
main argument to reduce direct costs to schooling is about enrollment, the variety of fees 
charged to students leads to absenteeism as well, which diminished total possible time for 
learning. A recent survey of low-fee private schools in Ghana found that 25% of 
households reported shortage of money caused a child to miss some schooling (Upadhay, 
Roland, & Burnett, 2016).  
In addition, attending a private school from the community can be appealing to 
students and parents who identify with the school leadership and culture. While one 
constraint in sending students to secondary schools for many families is transport, 
distance to school can also be measured through cultural distance from a community 
(World Bank, 2003). Winthrop and Sperling (2015) review studies that find community 
schools are particularly successful in improving access and completion for girls in a 
range of low and middle-income countries partly by providing a cultural environment 
more appropriate or acceptable to students and their parents.  
 
Methods 
 
This study adds to the research literature on PPPs and secondary school 
completion and quality by examining the impact of a policy that simultaneously removed 
school fees and enabled families to send children to low-fee private schools. The current 
mixed-methods study builds on a quantitative impact evaluation to explore the 
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perspectives of head teachers and parents, key stakeholders in education policy 
implementation, in order to answer the following research questions: 
1. How do parents and head teachers perceive the impact of USE and PPP on 
secondary school enrollment and quality? 
2. How do parents and head teachers in private schools in Uganda understand the 
ways in which PPP influenced student test scores? 
3. Do findings emerging from qualitative data on continuity of education as a 
mechanism for gains in test scores generalize to the larger quantitative sample? 
 
Research Design 
 
This study follows an explanatory mixed-methods design (Creswell, 2003) where 
qualitative analysis seeks to explain and explore results from a quantitative analysis. It is 
also sequenced to employ further analysis of quantitative data following qualitative 
analysis to see whether findings from the qualitative sample generalize to the larger 
sample. The previously-conducted quantitative study exploits a randomized-control trial 
evaluation conducted in 101 private secondary schools in Uganda between 2010 and 
2012. I collected the qualitative data from 11 of these schools in December 2014, 
purposively selected after preliminary analysis of the quantitative data (see Appendix A 
for the timeline).  
The total sample was obtained from eligible schools that initially applied to 
participate in the PPP at the end of 2010. Some schools did not enter the random 
evaluation as the Ministry of Education considered them to be serving communities in 
urgent need of support, and thus they received the program without lottery. The 
remaining sample of 101 schools was randomly assigned to two groups, the first of which 
was invited to participate in the program in 2011, while the control group was invited to 
start in 2012. The sample of 11 schools selected for the follow up qualitative study was 
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selected purposefully to include schools from diverse settings while considering the 
logistics of data collection. Schools were selected from both groups, after the PPP had 
begun in all sites; they were located in five different districts, and they served both urban 
and rural communities.  
Data for the quantitative study were collected by the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics 
(UBOS) and a local data collection firm from teachers, head teachers, and parents at four 
different time points: baseline (before randomization), twice in 2011, and once in 20126. 
In addition, the Uganda National Education Board (UNEB) assessed students in Math, 
English, and Biology under their annual National Assessment of Progress in Education 
(NAPE) study in the middle of each school year (for more on the quantitative methods, 
see Barrera-Osorio, de Galbert, Habyarimana, & Sabarwal, (2016)).  
I collected data for the qualitative study in December 2014. Data collection 
included interviews with 11 head teachers or other school administrators7 and focus 
groups with a total of 20 parents in seven of these schools8. I conducted the semi-
structured interviews in English and followed an interview guide developed to reflect 
questions that emerged from the quantitative data analysis and explore additional 
mechanisms (Appendix B). Interview guides were developed to (i) understand the 
perspectives of school administrators on PPP and USE in general, (ii) whether the policy 
had led to perceived changes in student enrollment and learning, and (iii) whether the 
mechanisms theorized in the design of the study were relevant and whether there were 
                                                 
6 UBOS collected baseline data and InfoPlus, a local data collection firm collected data at the three 
additional rounds. I participated in instrument design and testing, training of enumerators and supervised 
data collection at baseline and two of the three rounds.  
7 Interviews were designed to be conducted with head teachers. 9 were conducted with head teachers, and 2 
with another school administrator or the owner when the head teacher was not available.  
8 Recruitment of parents was done through the head teachers and it was not always possible to recruit 
parents who were available and spoke English during the data collection period.  
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important alternative mechanisms to consider. General questions included “Uganda 
introduced universal secondary education in 2007. How would you explain this policy to 
someone unfamiliar with Education in Uganda?” and “How has PPP influenced the 
implementation of USE in your community?” Specific questions on mechanisms included 
the following: “I would like to learn about the selection process of students who apply to 
S1. Do you ever have more applicants in S1 than you have room for?”  
I conducted focus groups with parents in English following a similar protocol 
(Appendix C) and with the same general aim. Questions included perspectives on the 
choice of school, such as “Why did you choose this school over another?” and “Was it 
difficult to enroll your child in S1?” Parents or legal guardians of students in schools 
participating in the program were invited to participate by the school administration, and 
focus groups ranged from 2 to 5 participants. Thirteen participants were fathers or male 
guardians and seven were mothers or female guardians. All participants provided written 
consent (Appendix D).  
 
Analytical Plan 
 
I coded transcripts from the interviews and focus groups first using an etic 
approach focused on the two main outcomes of interest (access and learning) and three 
pre-defined mechanisms tested in the quantitative evaluation (management, inputs, 
student composition). I then coded the transcripts using grounded theory to uncover any 
additional mechanisms through which PPP could impact access to and quality of 
education. I created a codebook that includes a label, a definition, a description of each 
code, qualifications or exclusions and examples of positive and negative occurrences of 
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the code following Boyatzis (1998). For instance, one code used to analyze the first 
research question and labeled “PPP – Access” was used to identify when participants 
discussed a change in enrollment following the policy, such as “One, the numbers have 
gone up in a good way, and the children are very … the parents of the children are very 
good” (see Appendix E for the code book). After coding all the transcripts, I wrote 
analytical memos about the codes most relevant to the research questions, which served 
as the basis for analysis and writing up of the findings. I draw on select quotations and 
examples in this paper that are representative of views expressed in interviews and focus 
groups across the dataset.  
After completing the qualitative analysis, I returned to the quantitative data 
collected from students in February 2012. In order to test whether perceptions emerging 
from parents and head teachers generalized to the larger sample, I specified an intent-to-
treat econometric model. Similar to the initial quantitative study, I regressed the 
mechanisms on a dummy variable indicating treatment (see Appendix F). Continuity of 
Education emerged as a key finding in the qualitative data, and I tested this mechanism 
using the larger sample. Second year students were asked about having been sent home 
for lack of fees and their absenteeism in previous weeks. In addition, I used student 
answers to questions about their perception of school to test whether the program affected 
their engagement in school (see Table 1 for the list of questions asked in the 2012 
survey).  
 
Validity 
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The internal validity of the study is supported by the randomized control-trial 
design and the triangulation of data through the qualitative explanatory analysis. The 
internal validity of the study is limited mainly by the small sample of the qualitative 
study and the sample selection. Having school administrators invite parents and guardians 
likely limited the sample to parents who are involved in the school and may have a more 
positive perception of the school. In addition, one practical limitation of the sample 
selection was the necessity of recruiting English-speaking participants, meaning parents 
able to participate were those with relatively higher levels of education and economic 
status. This may obscure some important perspectives on these policies such as barriers to 
school completion. Another important limitation to this study, as well as the quantitative 
evaluation, is the exclusion of government schools. Administrators from these schools, as 
well as parents who chose government schools could offer a different perspective on USE 
and PPP, and is an important area of further study. 
The external validity of the study is limited for two main reasons. First, the 
randomized control-trial was limited to schools in districts the ministry did not deem “in 
critical need.” Thus, the estimate of the impact of the program may not be externally 
valid to all low-fee private schools participating. It is possible that schools in districts 
considered most in need would have had larger impacts on increasing access to secondary 
school because of the limited schooling options. Second, the geographical limitation of 
the qualitative sample to five districts in the Central and Western regions of the country 
also undermines the external validity of findings. Although the schools participating 
served both urban and rural communities, none of the school were located in the most 
under-served parts of the country. Communities in the North and North-East of the 
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country, as well as those living in mountainous terrain and islands have had lower levels 
of access to education in recent decades because of conflict or geographical barriers than 
those in the center of the country. Understanding perspectives of those with largest 
obstacles is crucial to ensure access for all as these are typically the hardest to reach 
communities.  
 
Findings 
 
In this section, I present quantitative and qualitative data to answer the research 
questions. For the first two research questions, I use qualitative data to build on the 
findings from the previous quantitative study. I explore how participants in interviews 
and focus groups perceived the policy, its impact, and the mechanisms they identified as 
explanation. I answer the third research question through an analysis of the quantitative 
data.   
 
RQ1 – Impact of the Public Private Partnership Policy on Enrollment and Quality 
 
Results from the previous quantitative analysis led to clear findings on the 
outcome of the policy. Schools that participated in the program experienced a sharp 
increase in enrollment as soon as students could enroll without fees. On average, the 
increase across participating schools was similar for boys and girls and represented a 
growth in enrollment of approximately 35%. In addition, students in these schools 
performed better, on average, than their peers in similar schools not supported by the 
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policy, especially in math9 (see Barrera-Osorio et. al (2016) and Appendix G for relevant 
tables). In this section, I report how head teachers and parents interviewed largely 
perceived PPP as a component of USE and believed the policy had a positive impact on 
access and quality of education in their community.  
In interviews, participants described how they considered the PPP an integral part 
of USE, and they often described features of the PPP when asked more generally about 
USE. For example, Daniel10, a head teacher, answered a question about USE by 
explaining how the “government brings in the money for the USE students [they] admit” 
in the private school. Maria, a head teacher in an urban school participating said she 
could not “separate the two” policies. This view of PPP as a part of the overall policy is 
consistent with the explicit goals of the government when it introduced the partnership, as 
a temporary program to support secondary school expansion while the government 
increased its capacity.  
Head teachers interviewed all considered the participation of their school in the 
program had more positive than negative outcomes. Head teachers considered the policy 
as a benefit to the school as well as the community. For their school, head teachers saw 
the policy as an important source of funding and resources. In addition, administrators 
saw USE, and PPP particularly, as a financial relief for families. Paul, a deputy head 
teacher in a very rural setting explained that if USE only functioned through government 
schools, “it would not work well”. He explained that “there were some sub-counties with 
                                                 
9 The Ugandan National Examination Board (UNEB) assessed a random selection of students from the 
schools in the study. This included students benefiting from the USE sponsorship as well as those paying 
fees. The findings are therefore about all students in the schools.  
10 All names are changed. See Appendix H for the sample decomposition of the qualitative data and 
associated pseudonyms.  
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no government schools, but they are having private schools, so the government had to 
introduce that program in such private schools, such that the citizens in that area could 
also benefit from that program of paying fees for those students.” The program therefore 
offered subsidized access to families previously unable or unwilling to send children to a 
distant school.  
Parents described three main reasons for their positive view of the policy to 
include private schools as part of the implementation of USE: financial relief from paying 
school fees, quality of education to their children, and benefits to the community. John, a 
father in a rural school, said: “it has contributed toward the school fees of the learners. It 
has provided scholastic materials such as textbooks, some lab equipments. It even 
monitors the academic excellence of our schools. Because, [the government] normally 
sends a team to this school that looks at the teachers.” Clare, a mother said “it has helped 
some parents who cannot afford those expensive schools because, the money they pay 
[now] is a bit”. She added that it helped reduce drop out as well because “before, a 
student would come, and after two terms, no fees and then, she drops or he drops out of 
school. But at least [now] the drop out has decreased”. Alvin, a guardian in a rural 
community, also explained that government schools under USE were not able to provide 
the quality of teaching parents expected, so the option of a private school was appealing: 
“Schools of USE have become notorious for having poor quality in terms of teacher 
performance, because the teachers are not motivated, so the parents are always pushing 
hard to get money to send them to private schools, because they are performing well, 
better than the USE schools.” Alvin also explained that the increase in enrollment “also 
had an impact on business. People in the area have started small snack business.” 
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Ibrahim, a guardian in another community explicitly justified his choice of school for his 
sibling similarly, pointing to the government’s investment as a catalyst for community 
development. He explained: “if I bring my child here, I am creating jobs in my 
community. I want my place to develop. As we move, we want to develop areas. But it’s 
better to develop your home first.” Clare, in another community, believed that keeping 
students in the community would help in the long term as “those parents who pay fees in 
those big schools, those children will not come back to the community. (…) That’s why 
USE is very important to such communities”. Parents considered additional student and 
teachers in the community a vector for economic development.  
Head teachers and parents overall had a genuine appreciation for the policy. Their 
perceptions of the impact of PPP on access to secondary education was in line with the 
quantitative findings in that this policy indeed did increase enrollment. Head teachers 
reported their participation in the program enabled them to provide better education to 
more students, and parents reported they were able to access schools they generally 
considered to be higher quality. The only consistent critique of the program was the 
limited amount and irregularity of grant transfers, which I do not explore here. 
 
RQ2 – Mechanisms to Explain Gains in Student Test Scores 
 
Barrera-Osorio et al. (2016) examined three mechanisms suggested by previous 
research on Public-Private Partnerships to explain the gains in student test scores: change 
in school governance, inputs, and student composition. The results suggest no changes in 
school governance, few changes in inputs, but important changes in student composition 
(Appendix G). This supports the hypothesis that the policy increased access to secondary 
20 
 
school but that student selection and sorting rather than changes in the education 
experience of students could be responsible for higher test scores at the school-level. This 
section reports on the perspectives of head teachers and parents on these three 
mechanisms, which largely support the quantitative findings. In addition, the section 
discusses continuity of education, an additional mechanism that emerged from the data 
that could explain student gains in learning.  
 
School Governance 
One of the hypotheses formulated at the outset of the original study was that the 
creation of a formal link between the private school and the government would impact 
school governance. Governance might improve, such as through a better organized, more 
inclusive or more active governing board in the school, as well as increased government 
oversight. In contrast, providing access to families who are not required to pay fees could 
break an existing link between families and school administration, thus reducing 
accountability toward families. When examining the presence and composition of board 
of governors, school ownership and the frequency of meetings and absence of members, 
the quantitative evaluation found no evidence of change, either positive or negative, on 
average.  
Interview and focus group participants largely confirmed these findings. This may 
be due to the fact that all private schools, not just those part of the PPP, are subjected to 
the same requirements for the board of governors (BOG), so the program did not in fact 
institute any new requirements or necessitate any changes. Daniel explained what 
happened to the board of governors in his school, “nothing much has changed. As I've 
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told you, it was some kind of integration. (…) So basically it does almost the same thing, 
(…) it has just been made more formal than it used to be.” This notion that collaborating 
with the government only made the BOG more formal was echoed by Paul, a deputy head 
teacher who said that when the school was purely private, “there was no member from 
the district, even from the sub-county, but only the community members, and the staff 
members.” Only one of the eleven schools reported having had to create a BOG to take 
part in the program. Formal partnership through PPP had minimal impact on the 
existence of governing boards in the schools.  
In terms of responsibilities, participants provided similar perspectives, generally 
stating that participating in the program did not affect the role of BOG. The main 
responsibilities given to BOG are guidance (“oversee the activities of the school”) and 
financial advice (“approve the budget”) or support (“bringing funds”) to the 
administration of the school. Two schools also reported the board was in charge of hiring 
teachers and one schools said the board was in charge of ad hoc student discipline cases. 
Head teachers consistently reported that joining PPP did not change the responsibilities of 
the board and had little impact on oversight beyond what formal registration of a private 
school with the MoES required.   
 
Investment in Education 
 Although the decision for schools to partner with the government was largely 
motivated by the promise of financial and material resources, there should be no clear 
expectation that the spending per pupil would change and impact learning. First, the 
transfer from the government was meant to replace fees imposed by the school. Second, 
22 
 
the large increases in enrollment may require schools to invest in infrastructure rather 
than instructional materials. However, as discussed above, private actors may invest more 
optimally under a reliable stream of funding. The quantitative study examined changes in 
inputs that could impact learning through data on teachers and infrastructure. 
Participation in PPP had no impact on the number of teachers working at the school or 
their qualifications, but teachers were slightly more likely to be present and teaching. In 
addition, the study found few changes in infrastructure, with participating schools only 
reporting higher presence of science laboratories on average (Appendix G).  
The qualitative data suggested possible areas where financial and material inputs 
provided by the government grant may have been used in different ways to engender a 
positive impact on student learning. These findings complement and further explain the 
quantitative findings. Head teachers suggested three specific ways in which the 
partnership supported their instruction through inputs: textbooks, infrastructure, and 
teacher support. The majority of head teachers reported having received textbooks for 
“science” or “various disciplines.” Some schools reported having enough for each 
student, while others had “one for two students,” which was a positive change from the 
past. Head teachers clearly viewed this as helpful given the cost of textbooks often meant 
schools did not have textbooks for students. Suleiman, an owner of a school in a large 
town explained “it’s books that we could not afford; so at least students have enough 
materials to read”. Though evaluations of the impact of textbook distribution tend to 
minimize their impact (e.g. Glewwe, Kremer, & Moulin, 2007; Sabarwal, Evans, & 
Marshak, 2014), administrators in low-fee private schools perceived the availability of 
books as a clear benefit of the program.  
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Participant responses concerning investments in infrastructure were not consistent 
across schools. Overall, schools reported infrastructure projects to be long-term 
investments that existed prior to the program, and continued through the partnership. 
Their answers, however, pointed to two clear ways in which the grants enabled schools to 
invest in infrastructure projects. Patrick, a head teacher in an urban school explained that 
the grant did not allow for infrastructure expenditure but enabled schools to free some 
funding toward these projects: “PPP money is not supposed to do those things. They 
basically emphasize instructional materials. So the money I would have used for 
instructional materials, buying chalk or whatever (…) I use it [for infrastructure].” In 
addition to this shift across budget lines, the delivery of grants as a large transfer every 
term enabled schools with cash flow challenges to purchase expensive materials. Oliver, 
the owner of a peri-urban school explained what several administrators reported: “the 
money which comes from government comes in a lump sum, unlike the money that you 
collect locally. So it gives us an opportunity to plan (…) So in that way, because the 
money comes in lump sum, it has given us the ability to allocate (…) for infrastructure,” 
which require large transactions. Although the nature of the transactions in large sums 
enabled schools to make progress on infrastructure development, head teachers reported a 
history of the schools that suggests these investments were taking place similarly before 
the formal partnership.  
Finally, the program seems to have enabled schools to support to teachers in two 
ways. First, head teachers reported the partnership created a sense of security for teachers 
that salaries would be paid. Patrick explained that “it’s not the amount that changed, but 
in my case, what I have done is improving on the payment on time. Other times they 
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were going with debts, and quarrelling, and quarrelling, but now that has reduced.” 
Second, over half of the schools reported increasing benefits of teachers through meal or 
transport allocations as a result of the partnership. Maria, a head teacher in an urban 
school, described providing teachers with bonuses or tutoring opportunities: “When we 
get that money, you easily give transport, you give some allowance, you give some extra 
lesson, so the teacher is more secure.” These findings support and can explain how the 
quantitative study found no change in the number of teachers or qualifications but did 
find an increase in teachers’ presence in the school and in the classroom. A stronger sense 
of commitment to the school, along with additional financial support in part through 
additional work load could partly explain student gain in learning.  
 
Student Selection and school choice 
 The third hypothesis tested in the original study was that the policy induced 
schools or families to self-select into the program. This segregation across socio-
economic levels was documented in Chile when schools had the ability to choose which 
students to accept, as they did under the policy in Uganda. The impact evaluation noted 
that students in the program schools were qualitatively different, on average, than their 
peers in control schools. Specifically, students had stronger performance in the primary 
school leaving exam, had parents with higher levels of education and who were more 
likely to visit the school (Appendix G). These results suggest that, either the schools 
selected higher performing students, or that these families selected program schools at 
higher rates than control schools.  
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Head teachers and parents confirmed that students in the PPP schools had stronger 
academic background than the students who had previously enrolled at their schools. 
Schools overwhelmingly reported accepting all eligible students who applied (only one of 
the eleven schools, located in a densely populated urban setting, reported being over-
subscribed). Patrick explained: “as long as the ministry requirements, minimum entry 
requirements are fulfilled, we admit.” In addition, many schools reported accepting any 
student who applied and was not eligible for the government subsidy as a private student 
if they could pay the school fee. Kennedy, a head teacher in a rural school said “Now, the 
selection, really for us, we just welcome whoever has got those aggregates (…) Now, 
those who don't get those aggregates, we also admit them on private. They pay some little 
money, something like 50,000.”11 Parents in these schools all reported a similar 
application process, which required forms and processing fees, but no interview or 
selection process. Taking part in the program therefore enabled schools to recruit and 
subsidize students with higher levels of learning at the primary school level.  
The government criteria for student eligibility for USE – performance on the PLE 
– was seen by many participants as an important factor explaining the higher 
performance of students in PPP schools. Robert, head teacher in a peri-urban school 
reported his school had “changed in terms of enrollment, in term of quality of input, 
because the government only finances those who have performed well.” Daniel, another 
head teacher explained how his school was able to attract higher performing students: 
“Originally, when we were not under USE, you could hardly get a student in first grade12 
                                                 
11 Aggregates refers to Primary Leaving Exam (PLE) scores. Schools are allowed to admit and charge fees 
for students who do not pass the minimum score to be eligible for government sponsorship under USE and 
PPP. These students are often referred to as “private” students.  
12 First grade refers to the highest level of the PLE 
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joining us here. But at least now because they know there is USE, they come and join.” 
These findings confirm that sorting of students did take place across these private 
schools, and that the selection took place largely on the part of families, not schools. 
Understanding the families’ decision process in choosing schools for their children is thus 
important.  
Parents provided three main reasons for choosing the schools in the sample: 
proximity, community, and quality. Amina, a guardian, provided two of these reasons. “I 
find it more convenient to bring my kid here, because the school is very near. Two, I can 
monitor the child. (…) Another reason is with religion. I am a Muslim, but they bring the 
sheiks, the teachers who teach religion here. Because I find it very hard to bring the child 
to a school which is very far and a Christian school, because I am Muslim.” Ibrahim, a 
guardian in the same school, added concrete benefits of proximity: “it’s very close to 
where I am staying. It’s very easy to monitor my brother from here. Even he could come 
at night for evening preps (…) I can talk to the administrators directly. I can come to the 
office.” James, a parent in a rural school also explained that there was “no way [he] was 
going to take a child five miles away when [he] stays nearby.” 
Community ties were also expressed by parents, as a form of proximity. Peter a 
parent in a peri-urban school explained his reasons for choosing the school: “you look at 
the love between a parent and the technical people in that school. It’s the first priority. 
Because you must be friendly, if you cannot be a partner and friendly, I cannot bring my 
kid.” Clare, a mother in the same school shared having had difficulties in paying some of 
the financial requirements at this school and feeling comfortable coming to the owner: 
“Even me, I can cry to the director to excuse me.” Valentine, another father explained the 
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importance of the relationship with administrators: “you know this school, where most of 
time it’s the nearest to the people. So the directors and technical people, they are next to 
their clients, because they are closer so (…) you know your community they know you. 
(…) the [government people] they are very far from the parents, to the peasant people.” 
Finally, as described above, some parents felt the school was an important institution for 
their community, even when the schools were owned by a private individual. John and 
Samson, two parents in a rural school expressed this by saying the school was “a school 
of poor people and rich people, (…) it’s almost like a community school.” Parents 
interviewed considered the private schools in their communities as important institutions 
and chose to send their children to these schools in large part because of their 
geographical and cultural proximity.  
Lastly, parents generally perceived the schools they chose to be of higher quality 
than the local government school. They considered teacher absenteeism and student 
performance as indicators of quality. Robert, a parent perceived teacher absenteeism as 
an important difference between public and private schools. “Because being on 
government payroll, he does whatever he feels to do. Even if he doesn’t work for two 
weeks. The head master may just ask him why he has not taught, and it stops there. In 
private school, the owner, to me I think the owner is very much more strict than in 
government schools.” James, a parent, claimed “performance is better in national 
examinations, and that has really encouraged parents”. Alvin, a parent in the same school 
compared the performance on national exams to the nearest government school: “it’s a 
government school nearby. They had 3 first grades last year. And their total student 
population is over 1,000. This school has about 400 students, and they had 4 first grades 
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last year. So if you do a comparative, that’s very clear.” Unsurprisingly, parents largely 
considered school quality as an important factor in deciding which school to send their 
children to.  
 
Continuity of Education 
One perceived impact of the policy that emerged from parents and head teachers 
during the qualitative study was the benefit students faced by avoiding being sent home 
for lack of fees. Students attending private secondary school face important costs in cash 
or kind, whether or not official fees are charged. Many private schools allow families to 
pay in installments. Occasionally, schools send students home for several days, or until 
they are able to pay their arrears. As head teacher Maria explained in frustration “How do 
I fit them? How can I pay the teachers? (…) To sustain them in school, you need money. 
Children here in school, eat lunch. You need the facilitation, like electricity if you are 
going to use the computers, library, you need to facilitate them, so if you are going to 
keep them around, they need to pay. You can’t keep them around unless they pay.” 
Private schools reported using suspension or expulsion of students who could not pay 
both as means to remain financial viable and as an instrument to encourage families to 
settle debts.  
 In discussing USE and PPP, participants systematically alluded to the financial 
burden education poses to families. One of the direct consequence of this burden is the 
interruption of schooling of students to collect fees from parents, or in some cases, to go 
work to pay for the fees they owe. Student sponsorship through PPP seems to have 
reduced this phenomenon in two ways. First, the government sponsorship reduces the 
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amount of money parents must raise. As Clare explained, “only that small money for 
feeding the teachers and transporting them, most parents can afford. But when it comes to 
fees, you can pay half and at the end of the day you’ve failed to pay the balance.” In 
addition, having students sponsored by the government enrolled in private schools caused 
some schools to be more wary about sending them home. Maria explained that students 
under the program would only be sent home after “a lot of consideration” and that they 
would “need to do a lot with the parents” before sending the students away. 
Administrators generally reported being less likely to send sponsored students home, 
although it was not always the case. Kennedy admitted taking the risk: “even if these 
government officials come from Kampala, again, we stand to be blamed.”  
Parents almost unanimously claimed the administration at their school was more 
understanding than in private schools not part of the PPP. Betty, a mother in an urban 
setting with many schools claimed, “In those schools, the private schools, you have to 
pay 40, you don’t have it, by the time they want it, they have to chase the girl to go back 
home to bring money. When it’s not there, she has to sit, or sit at home. It’s a problem.” 
John, a parent at the same school said it was different there: “you come with the little you 
have, even if I have 1000, I can come and say please, this is what I get, tomorrow I will 
be getting another one.” Parents reported high levels of flexibility from administrators in 
payment timeline, as well as some schools accepting payments in kind.  
The impact of an interrupted schooling experience was clear for participants. 
Fatima, a head teacher explained: “They are on and off, they are looking for fees, so it is 
hard for them to concentrate, so you will find that their performance is not so good.” 
Amina, a mother in that school had similar views: “so you find that the child is missing 
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almost half a term, he is seated at home, and you find it very hard to catch up with other 
students.” Clare, a mother at another school expressed fear for students whose schooling 
is interrupted: “Suppose you miss term 1, 3 weeks, then in another term, 2 weeks, then 
term 3, two weeks like that. At the end of the day, you’ll find yourself missing a whole 
term. Without attending classes. And remember, when teachers teach, they follow the 
syllabus. So they will complain ‘you never taught us this’ but you were taught, but you 
were not around.” Clearly, absenteeism was understood as a barrier to learning given the 
incremental nature of learning and the large amount of material in the curriculum.  
 
Overall, the qualitative data confirm the main findings from the quantitative 
study. PPP has led to an increased enrollment in private schools, and one of the main 
drivers for the better performance of students is likely to be a sorting of students. The 
policy also seems to allow low-fee private schools to have textbooks and their teachers 
are better supported. In addition, data suggests that one possible mechanism to explain 
improved performance comes from an increase in the stability of the student experience. 
The following section explores whether there was evidence of continuity of education in 
the larger sample of students.  
 
RQ3 – Continuity of Education as a Mechanism to Explain Gains in Student Test 
Scores 
  
As discussed above, administrators and parents in participating schools clearly 
expressed that students attending secondary school under government sponsorship were 
less likely to be sent home for failing to have met financial obligations. Participants 
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mainly explained how continuity of education could positively impact student learning 
through increased opportunities to learn with teachers. Another possible mechanism 
resulting from being sent home, or an ongoing threat of interruption, is through students 
changing their perception of school, feeling less connected and thus reducing their 
motivation or ability to focus. Using surveys administered to students in February 2012, I 
test whether there is evidence of either of these mechanisms.  
Table 1 presents intent-to-treat estimates of the impact of the program on students 
at the beginning of their second year. This group of students was the first cohort of 
students participating in the program school, and the last cohort of students not 
participating in the control schools. The first column includes the mean and standard 
deviation for the control group. Columns 2 and 3 present the results of OLS regression 
with and without fixed effects at the regional level. The first panel presents demographic 
characteristics of students confirming that the students in the treatment schools were, on 
average, slightly younger than their peers in control schools, and that the sample was 
balanced across gender.  
The second panel presents three variables confirming the findings that emerged 
from the interviews and focus groups. Among students in the control schools, nearly 70% 
reported having been sent home in the previous academic year because of school fees, 11 
percentage points higher than students in treatment schools. Similarly, 47% of students in 
control schools were absent at least once in the previous two weeks compared with 40% 
in the treatment schools. The reason for the absence for both groups of students was 
overwhelmingly financial – 80% having to work or lacking fees for school – and there 
were no statistical differences between groups. These findings confirm that students 
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enrolled in private schools under PPP were more likely to spend more time in school than 
their peers enrolled in other private schools without government subsidy13.  
The third panel presents answers to eight questions students answered about their 
perception of school. These questions were answered using a Likert scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Students, on average, reported working hard at 
school (4.18), liking school (4.47) and thinking that school is important (3.98). Notably, 
however, there were no statistical differences on any of these measures between students 
in the treatment and control schools. These results suggest that the program had no 
impact on students’ perception of school, despite having led to an average increase in 
continuation of education.  
 
Discussion 
 
The findings of this study provide insight for countries working toward reaching 
the Sustainable Development Goals focused on secondary school completion and quality. 
Under the Universal Secondary Education policy, the Ugandan government has been able 
to expand access to secondary school. The partnership with low-fee private schools 
played in an important role in expanding the capacity of the government, as can attest the 
large proportion of students enrolled under USE in private schools (42% in 2013; MoES, 
2013b). Perspectives shared by some parents in this study suggest that their children 
would likely have attended a government school under USE had there been no private 
                                                 
13 Using logistic regression on these binary outcomes provides similar estimates. The significance levels are 
the same for estimated differences in log-odds, and the predicted probabilities are very similar (69% sent 
home in control group versus 58% in the treatment group; 47% absent in the control group versus 40% in 
the treatment group).  
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option. The PPP program enabled other families to extend their children’s education 
through reducing the distance between the school and their communities. For those living 
in remote areas not served by government schools, the PPP provided a school with 
geographically proximity, facilitating access where there would have been none. In 
addition to physical distance, the availability of private schools akin to community 
schools reduced the cultural distance for families unwilling to send their children to large 
government secondary schools run by administrators from different religious or 
ethnolinguistic groups. These findings build on studies reporting increased education 
completion following the construction of locally-situated public primary schools (e.g. 
Duflo, (2001) in Indonesia) or community schools (e.g. Burde and Linden (2013) in 
Afghanistan).  The partnership removed some barriers to access from the demand side 
similar to those described in the review by Winthrop and Sperling (2015). In addition to 
improving access, USE and PPP may have impacted the quality of education provided.  
One key finding of the study was the increased stability in the continuity of 
education of students attending low-fee private schools under USE compared to those 
paying fees. Students enrolled in low-fee private schools were less likely to be sent home 
and miss school because of financial difficulties, especially if they were eligible under 
USE. This was the direct result of (i) the reduction of direct costs of attendance and (ii) 
the change in behavior from some schools. This behavior change may be a direct reaction 
to the first “general principle” of the MoU that requires schools to consult with the MoES 
before dismissing students (Brans, 2011, Appendix G). Continuity of education enables 
students to learn more both because of the increased learning opportunities and because 
new material builds from previous knowledge, which absenteeism disrupts. In addition, 
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engagement with the labor market while away from school increases the opportunity cost 
of returning to school. Without knowledge of how USE impacted behavior of 
government schools with regard to students unable to pay fees, we cannot infer how USE 
impacted continuity of education for those choosing to enroll in public schools. 
Removing official fees, however, does not sufficiently reduce financial burdens facing 
those most in need. Akyeampong (2009) finds that removing fees in Ghana was most 
beneficial for middle-class families and left poorest households unable to offset the 
indirect costs and opportunity costs of schooling. This finding was consistent with 
participants in this study who explained how indirect costs led to interruption of 
schooling and dropout. The increase in continuity of education for students enrolled in 
PPP schools should be considered an important positive impact of the policy, even if the 
benefits might not accrue to the more vulnerable who did not access these schools.  
Another important finding of this study was the increase stability provided by 
schools to teachers. The quantitative study highlighted an increase presence of teachers in 
classrooms but no change in salary. This study suggests that the increase in presence is 
due to (i) increased perception of financial stability of the school by teachers and (ii) 
increased benefits through non-salary compensation or opportunities to earn more 
through tutoring. Teachers working in private schools face a certain level of precarity 
characterized by the low level of stability of schools (7% of the schools in our sample 
closed permanently over the course of the study) and low salaries. Few studies examine 
the longevity of low-fee private schools, but longevity seems to be an important 
challenge, and partnership with the government could help bring stability, or at least 
perception of stability, which is important for teachers and families alike. In addition, the 
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public nature of the grants seemed to give a perception of accountability that provides 
teachers greater guarantee that payments will come, even if late. Finally, the increased 
material support could lead to greater motivation and commitment, resulting in the 
increased time in class highlighted in the quantitative study. Research with teachers could 
shed light on the specific reasons that led to increased presence in the classroom. 
One important concern highlighted by this study is the notion that public-private 
partnerships increases socioeconomic segregation through sorting. Schools participating 
in the PPP in Uganda were able to enroll students with higher performance at the primary 
level and with relatively higher socioeconomic levels. Although we had no information 
on students in the surrounding government schools, this finding is consistent with sorting 
along socioeconomic lines found in other PPP programs. Parents with higher social and 
economic capital were able to choose schools that offered USE subsidies leaving students 
from lower-income families in schools with fewer resources. This segregation, which 
leads to public resources being spent away from the most vulnerable families, is one of 
the most important criticisms of public-private partnerships as it raises equity issues. 
Lewis and Patrinos (2011) offer guidelines to mitigate segregation in PPP, including 
removing a school’s ability to select students based on performance or family 
characteristics. Policies where the government assigns students to schools, such as the 
concession schools in Bogota (Barrera-Osorio, 2007) or the new legislation in Chile that 
requires schools to select students following a “system that guarantees transparency, 
equity and equal opportunity” (República de Chile, 2015; article 1.6) aim precisely to 
reduce segregation across socioeconomic class. Equity concerns remain in these systems 
given low-fee private schools do not reach the poorest households (Srivastava, 2013; 
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Upadhay et al., 2016). This is likely even more pronounced for secondary schools than 
primary schools as the completion of primary cycles is already unequal.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Efforts to expand access to and completion of quality secondary school require 
policies that will remove the structural barriers low-income families face and enable 
school-level improvements to the learning environment. This paper explored a policy in 
Uganda that simultaneously removed user fees and offered parents an alternative to 
government schools because of the limited capacity to absorb the growing student 
population. The impact of USE and the PPP has been consistent with the explicit goals of 
the policy in expanding access to secondary school. Students in the program 
demonstrated higher levels of learning than their peers in similar schools that were not 
part of the program. This difference is likely due to a combination of segregation and 
changes in student experiences. The PPP in Uganda led to schools enrolling students with 
higher levels of learning and higher socioeconomic background. It also reduced the 
frequency of students having to miss school for lack of financial resources. Finally, it led 
to slightly higher levels of teacher presence.  
Countries looking to expand access to secondary education should carefully 
consider the financial barriers faced by students, including the detrimental effects of 
school interruption. Partnering with private schools where government capacity is lacking 
may be an effective way to expand access. The role of the private sector is viewed with 
ambivalence by education stakeholders globally (Aubry & Dorsi, 2016; Srivastava, 2013; 
UNESCO, 2016) in large part because of the perception that it does not serve most in 
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need and may reinforce inequalities. Designing policies in a way that supports the most 
vulnerable families requires careful design to avoid segregation along socioeconomic 
lines or other unintended regressive outcomes.  
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Table 1. Results from Research Question 3     
 Check 3 
 
Control Mean 
and SD 
Treatment-
Control 
Treatment-
Control 
  (1) (2) (3) 
A. Characteristics of Students: Demographics   
Students' age 16.15 -0.449** -0.281** 
 (1.81)  (0.18)  (0.14)  
Gender (1 male) 0.50 -0.024 -0.017 
 (0.50)  (0.03)  (0.03)  
    
B. Continuity of Education    
Sent Home for fees last year 0.69 -0.112** -0.110** 
 (0.46)  (0.05)  (0.04)  
Absence, last two weeks 0.47 -0.068* -0.075** 
 (0.50)  (0.04)  (0.04)  
Reason for absence was money 0.80 -0.008 0.002 
 (0.40)  (0.03) -0.03 
C. Student Perception of School    
I work hard at school 4.18 0.042 0.00 
 (0.96)  (0.09)  (0.08)  
I like school 4.47 -0.018 -0.055 
 (0.89)  (0.07)  (0.07)  
I get in trouble at school 2.44 -0.009 -0.028 
 (1.32)  (0.10)  (0.10)  
I get bored at school 2.54 -0.111 -0.135 
 (1.38)  (0.09)  (0.09)  
School is important 3.98 0.003 -0.033 
 (1.02)  (0.09)  (0.09)  
Other people at school like me 4.45 0.014 -0.033 
 (0.90)  (0.07)  (0.06)  
I give up when school is hard 4.02 -0.023 -0.038 
 (0.99)  (0.07)  (0.07)  
I always do my homework 3.00 -0.071 -0.118 
 (1.43)  (0.11)  (0.10)  
        
Fixed Effects Region level  No Yes 
Number of obs.  585 1299 1299 
Test for jointly significance    
Chi2   37.775 
Prob>Chi2   0.009 
Note. Column (1) report mean and standard deviation for the control group. Columns (2) and 
(3) report the estimate of effects of a regression of  each outcome variable against the treatment 
indicator, controlling for regional fixed effects.  Standard errors are cluster at the school level.  
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Appendix A – Timeline of Study 
 
October 2010    – Schools apply to participated in PPP 
December 2010   – Baseline Data Collection 
January 2011    – Random assignment of schools to treatment groups 
February 2011   – Start of school year (51 schools in Treatment) 
February 2012   – Start of school year (all schools in Treatment) 
April 2011 – July 2012  – Quantitative Data Collection 
December 2014  – Qualitative Data Collection 
 
Sample size and collection of data      
    Baseline Check 1 NAPE 2011 Check 2 Check 3 NAPE 2012 
Time  
Dec 
2010/April 
2011 July 2011 July 2011 Sept 2011 Feb 2012 July 2012 
        
Head Teachers Survey       
 
Treated 
School 43 48 48 48 49 48 
 Control 41 48 45 46 46 45 
        
Teachers       
 
Treated 
School 119      
 Control 105      
        
Students       
 
Treated 
School 944  1230  1467 1268 
  Control 801   1126   1261 990 
Note: calculation of sample size using data collected at baseline, three follow-up (Check 1-3) and two test applications (NAPE) 
 
 
  
Appendix B – Questionnaire to Head Teachers 
 
Head Teacher assent – consent form already signed 
In this interview, I would like to discuss with you some questions around access and quality of 
education in secondary schools in Uganda, with particular focus on your community and your 
school.  
Do you have any questions before we start? 
Questions Rationale 
 
Part 1. Background on the community/school 
 
1. Could you tell me a little bit more about the 
community where your school is located? 
 
• Is the community mostly urban, rural? 
• Are there other primary or secondary 
schools in the area? 
• Do most students in the community 
attend secondary school? 
 
 
2. I would like to know a bit more about the 
school itself. 
 
• When did the school open? Who opened 
the school?  
• Are the people who started the school still 
the owners today? 
• When did you join the school? 
 
 
 
 
This part is meant to create a rapport 
with the interviewee and get a better 
understanding of the school and its 
community. (Some interviews will not 
take place in the school).  
 
 
These questions will give us a better 
sense of the community where the 
school is located, and the students it 
primarily serves. 
 
 
These questions will give us an idea of 
the type of school this is. Was it started 
by a church, a business person, a 
community group?  
 
We will use these questions to 
understand if the partnership operates 
differently in different types of schools.  
Part 2. Education policy and its impact in the 
community 
 
3. Uganda introduced universal secondary 
education in 2007. How would you explain this 
policy to someone unfamiliar with Education in 
Uganda? 
 
How has this policy impacted access to education 
in your community? 
• Prompts on barriers to access in the 
community 
 
 
This part is meant to understand 
whether and how the community 
experienced the introduction of USE, 
and how the HT understands the policy.  
 
 
 
These questions will help understand 
how the head teacher, and community, 
  
 
o Distance to schools 
o Fees or requirements 
o Perceptions about secondary 
schools being the norm 
 
• Prompts on barriers to quality of schools 
o Type of teachers 
o Class size 
o Pedagogy 
o Purposes of education 
 
4. Uganda introduced a public-private partnership 
in 2007 where private schools could apply to 
partner with the government to provide 
secondary education to students.  
How would you explain this policy to someone 
not familiar with Education in Uganda? 
 
• How has this policy influenced the 
implementation of USE in your 
community? 
o Prompts on change in number of 
schools, number of students 
attending secondary school.  
 
5. How has your school approached participating 
or not participating in the PPP program? 
• Prompts on dates of application, dates of 
acceptance/refusal, reasons for applying, 
who decided to apply (decision power).  
 
feels the new policy impacted 
education.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These questions will help to confirm or 
correct our understanding of this 
schools participation. (We know they 
participated). We can also get a sense 
of whether there were concerns about 
joining the program.  
Part 3 – Operation of the school 
 
6. I would like to know more about the board of 
governors in your school. Do you have a board of 
governors? 
 
• Prompt questions on composition of the 
board, selection process (election?), 
frequency of meetings, responsibilities, 
role of the school owners. 
• How has joining PPP changed the 
operation of your BoG? 
 
7. I would like to learn about the selection 
process of students who apply to S1. Do you ever 
 
This part will explore the three 
hypotheses drawn from the literature 
and tested in the quantitative part of the 
paper: governance, selection and 
change in inputs.  
 
 
 
Governance. One hypothesis states that 
when parents no longer pay fees, the 
accountability that school leaders faced 
toward the community is reduced, 
leading to weaker community 
engagement.  
  
 
have more applicants in S1 than you have room 
for? 
 
• Prompt for selection criteria (PLE scores, 
interviews, modes of assessing who is the 
“better” student for the school, first come 
serve) 
 
8. How has participation in PPP affected your 
enrollment? 
• Prompt for number of applications, 
number of S1 students, boy-girl change, 
PLE scores of applicants? 
• How has PPP changed the pool of 
applicants to your school? 
• How has PPP changed your mode of 
accepting students? 
 
9. I would like to learn more about your teachers. 
How often do you hire new teachers? 
 
• How do you identify the best teachers for 
your school? Prompt for certificates, 
experience, network or recommendations. 
• How has this changed since you joined 
PPP? 
o Prompt for hiring new teachers, 
increasing salaries, more training. 
 
10. I would like to know about your investment 
in infrastructure. How often do you invest in 
infrastructure? 
 
• Prompt for classrooms, science lab, 
latrines, teacher housing. 
• How are decisions made about investment 
in infrastructure? 
• How have you been able to change 
investments in infrastructure since joining 
PPP. 
 
 
 
 
Selection. One hypothesis states that 
given a larger pool of applicants, 
schools can select the better students.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inputs – Teachers 
One hypothesis states that with larger 
inputs, schools are able to hire better 
teachers or give them more support.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inputs - Infrastructure 
One hypothesis states that with larger 
inputs, schools are able to invest in 
infrastructure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11. I recently read in the newspaper that the 
government is likely to end the PPP policy. How 
do you think this will impact your school? 
 
 
This question aims at looking forward 
to attempt to get to the same three 
hypotheses on mechanism for the PPP.  
 
  
 
• Prompt for student composition, 
governance of the school, teacher 
composition, infrastructure development.  
 
12. A recent study of the PPP program found that 
students performed better in S2 on NAPE tests. 
Researchers were not able to find out why 
students were doing better than in non-PPP 
schools. Do you have any ideas to explain this? 
 
13. Are there any other changes due to PPP that 
you want to discuss with me? 
 
 
 
 
 
This question aims at generating new 
hypotheses to answer the research 
question. 
Is there anything else that you would like to let me know about the questions we 
discussed? 
Thank you for your time 
  
  
 
Appendix C – Focus Group Protocols 
 
Parent assent – consent form already signed 
In this discussion, I would like to hear some of your thoughts around access and quality of 
education in Uganda, with particular focus on your community and your school.  
Do you have any questions before we start? 
Questions Rationale 
 
Part 1. Background on the community/school 
 
1. Could you tell me a little bit more about the 
community? 
 
• Is the community mostly urban, rural? 
• How many primary or secondary schools 
are in the area? 
• Do most students in the community attend 
primary or secondary school? 
 
 
2. I would like to know a bit more about your 
families, and the schools your children attend. 
 
• How many children do you have in 
school currently? 
• What are all the schools your children 
have attended? 
 
 
 
 
 
This part is meant to create a rapport 
with the informants and get a better 
understanding of the community.  
 
 
These questions will give us a better 
sense of the community where the 
school is located. 
 
 
 
These questions are meant to build 
more rapport and better understand the 
family context of the informants.   
Part 2. Education policy and its impact in the 
community 
 
3. Uganda introduced universal secondary 
education in 2007. How would you explain this 
policy to someone unfamiliar with Education in 
Uganda? 
 
How has this policy impacted access to education 
in your community? 
• Prompts on barriers to access in the 
community 
o Distance to schools 
o Fees or requirements 
 
 
This part is meant to understand 
whether and how the community 
experienced the introduction of USE, 
and how the families understands the 
policy.  
 
 
 
These questions will help understand 
how the head teacher, and community, 
feels the new policy impacted 
education.  
  
 
o Perceptions about secondary 
schools being the norm 
 
• Prompts on barriers to quality of schools 
o Type of teachers 
o Class size 
o Pedagogy 
o Purposes of education 
 
4. Uganda introduced a public-private partnership 
in 2007 where private schools could apply to 
partner with the government to provide 
secondary education to students.  
How would you explain this policy to someone 
not familiar with Education in Uganda? 
 
• How has this policy influenced the 
implementation of USE in your 
community? 
o Prompts on change in number of 
schools, number of students 
attending secondary school.  
 
5. How has your school approached participating 
or not participating in the PPP program? 
• Prompts on dates of application, dates of 
acceptance/refusal, reasons for applying, 
who decided to apply (decision power).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These questions will help to confirm or 
correct our understanding of this 
schools participation. (We know they 
participated). We can also get a sense 
of whether there were concerns about 
joining the program.  
Part 3 – Interaction with the school 
 
6. I would like to know more about your choice 
for secondary school.  
 
• How did you hear about this school for 
your children? 
• Why did you choose this school over 
another? 
• How does this school compare with other 
secondary schools? 
• How does the quality of this school 
compare with the primary schools where 
your children went?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
This part will inform us on the parent 
decision to send their children to 
school. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
7. What was the process of applying for S1? 
 
• Was it difficult to enroll your child in S1 
here? 
• Were there interviews, or exams to get in? 
• Did your child benefit from the PPP 
partnership with government? (Did you 
pay fees)? 
• Do you pay other requirements? 
 
. 
 
 
8. I recently read in the newspaper that the 
government is likely to end the PPP policy. How 
do you think this will impact your school and 
community? 
 
• Prompt for student composition, 
governance of the school, teacher 
composition, infrastructure development.  
 
9. A recent study of the PPP program found that 
students performed better in S2 on NAPE tests. 
Researchers were not able to find out why 
students were doing better than in non-PPP 
schools. Do you have any ideas to explain this? 
 
10. Are there any other changes due to PPP that 
you want to discuss with me? 
 
 
This question aims at looking forward 
to attempt to get parents to discuss 
hypotheses about how PPP operates.  
 
 
 
 
 
This question aims at generating new 
hypotheses to answer the research 
question. 
Part 4 – Thematic Curriculum 
 
11. I would now like to ask you about another 
policy change in Uganda, regarding the thematic 
curriculum. How would you explain this policy 
introduced in 2007 in Uganda? 
• Prompt for themes, language, transition to 
P4. 
• Prompt for languages used in this 
community, in the primary schools in this 
community. 
 
 
12. In your opinion, what languages should be 
taught in primary schools in your community? 
 
This part aims at discussing the 
parental view on language of 
instruction in the school.  
 
 
This question aims at understanding 
how parents view the thematic 
curriculum reform.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
• Prompt for why 
• Prompt for how long 
 
13. What are some advantages of using national 
languages with small children in school? 
 
• Prompt for disadvantages. 
 
14. What languages should a Ugandan who has a 
university degree know? 
• What languages should she be able to 
read and write? 
 
Is there anything else about languages in schools 
and communities that you would like to share 
with me? 
This question aims to understand how 
parents feel about local languages in 
school.  
 
 
 
 
This question aims at understanding the 
perceptions parents have of advantages 
and disadvantages of using national 
languages in school.  
 
 
 
This question aims at understanding 
how parents view the goals of 
education in terms of linguistic 
instruction.  
Is there anything else that you would like to let me know about the questions we 
discussed? 
Thank you for your time 
 
  
  
 
Appendix D – Informed Consent form 
 
Study Title: Understanding Access and Quality of Junior Secondary Education in 
Uganda 
Investigator: Pierre de Galbert 
 
Participation is voluntary 
It is your choice whether or not to participate in this research.  If you choose to participate, 
you may change your mind and leave the study at any time.  Refusal to participate or stopping 
your participation will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise 
entitled. 
 
What is the purpose of this research? 
The purpose of this research is to examine the changes to access and quality of education in 
junior secondary schools in Uganda since the introduction of Universal Secondary Education.  
  
How long will I take part in this research? 
You will participate in an interview and be asked questions about your experience working 
in education in Uganda. This interview will take approximately 45 minutes. 
 
I may be interested in re-contacting you for additional information or clarifications after 
the interview. If I do, your participation would be completely up to you. If you would 
prefer that we refrain from re-contacting you, please intital below: 
 
 Please do not re-contact me following the study: ____________ 
 
What can I expect if I take part in this research? 
As a participant, you will be interviewed once. The interview will be at a time and place 
convenient to you. The interview will ask about your experience as a Head Teacher in 
Uganda. With your permission, I will make an audio recording of the interview. 
  
What are the risks and possible discomforts? 
If you choose to participate, there is a chance that the confidentiality protections for the 
information about your school could be compromised.  
 
Are there any benefits from being in this research study?  
We do not expect any direct benefits to you from your taking part in this research.  
 
Will I be compensated for participating in this research? 
You will not be compensated for participating in this research. 
 
If I take part in this research, how will my privacy be protected? What 
happens to the information you collect?  
  
 
The data we collect will be kept in a password-protected computer system. Reports of the 
results will remove any information that could allow someone to identify you.  
 
The information with your name on it will be analyzed by the researcher(s) and may be 
reviewed by people checking to see that the research is done properly.   
 
If I have any questions, concerns or complaints about this research study, 
who can I talk to? 
The researcher for this study is Pierre de Galbert, who can be reached at (1) 617 510 1987, 
pgd135@mail.harvard.edu  
  
• If you have questions, concerns, or complaints, 
• If you would like to talk to the research team, 
• If you think the research has harmed you, or  
• If you wish to withdraw from the study.  
 
This research has been reviewed by the Committee on the Use of Human Subjects in 
Research at Harvard University.  They can be reached at 617-496-2847, 1414 
Massachusetts Avenue, Second Floor, Cambridge, MA 02138, or cuhs@fas.harvard.edu 
for any of the following: 
• If your questions, concerns, or complaints are not being answered by the research 
team, 
• If you cannot reach the research team, 
• If you want to talk to someone besides the research team, or 
• If you have questions about your rights as a research participant. 
 
Statement of Consent  
I have read the information in this consent form.  All my questions about the research have 
been answered to my satisfaction.   
 
SIGNATURE 
Your signature below indicates your permission to take part in this research. You will be 
provided with a copy of this consent form.  
 
________________________________________________________ 
      Printed name of participant 
 
_______________________________________________________    
_____________________ 
          Signature of participant      Date 
 
 
 
  
  
 
Appendix E – Codebook 
 
 
Label Definition Description Examples 
BOG - history 
Descriptions of the 
school management, 
Boards of Directors 
and/or Governors, 
per and post USE 
These three codes 
include all aspects of 
school management 
discussed during 
interviews/protocols. 
These can include 
Board of Governors 
or other 
management 
structures, the 
membership or 
responsibility of 
these governing 
structures 
"In fact before that time, I did not have a 
BOG" 
BOG - 
members 
Descriptions of BOG 
membership, 
numbers, elections, 
etc. 
"The proprietors. the church is represented 
by one person, the teachers are represented 
by one person, the parents are represented, 
and then the teachers are also represented." 
BOG - 
responsibilities 
Descriptions of BOG 
responsibilities 
"For example, in terms of salary, it decides 
the salaries, decides the expenditures, 
decides on tuition, how much to pay, and 
when to increase, and even other things" 
Community 
Description 
Descriptions of the 
community, including 
parents, economic 
activity, and 
schooling of children 
in general 
This broad code 
includes any 
description of the 
community around 
the school 
"Well this community is somehow, what can I 
can call it, it's very mixed, we have people 
who are doing basically informal work, 
tailors, hawkers, cobblers, housewives, so 
basically it is mixed, and the problem with 
this area, there are some students who do 
not go to school, and they engage with some 
things like drugs, some things like that, so it's 
not a very easy area, so it has some elements 
almost like a slum." 
Inputs - 
infrastructure 
Descriptions of 
investment in school 
infrastructure, pre 
and post USE 
These four codes 
include any 
discussion of 
investments 
traditionally 
discussed as inputs in 
the economic 
literature: learning 
materials, teachers, 
infrastructure. This 
includes specific 
inputs related to the 
PPP policy as well as 
other investments 
made by the 
community or 
owners 
"In 2007, when we came, or when we 
started, we only had this [points to one 
building], even we just changed this fashion 
here, you see, but it was a hall, one 2, 3, it 
was 4 rooms here. This whatever here. Now, 
we put up the other one. We put the white 
one you have seen, and now we are trying to 
have this one stand." 
Inputs - 
materials 
Descriptions of 
school materials 
inputs, including 
books, science 
materials etc.  
"But at least, it’s books that we could not 
afford. So at least students have enough 
materials to read. Only that in sciences, the 
lab equipment, computer literacy, we are just 
the ones buying. Government has not 
provided. " 
Inputs - PPP 
support 
Descriptions of 
materials support 
provided by PPP 
partnership 
"Because the government recently gave us 
textbooks, which necessitated that the library 
becomes larger to accommodate the 
facilitation and have more children using" 
  
 
Inputs - 
teachers 
Description of 
teacher hiring, 
salaries and training 
at the school 
"A good teacher must be principled. Must be 
an example, exemplary. It’s a bit broad. 
When I say exemplary, do you keep time, do 
you dress well, do you respect others, do you 
respect yourself, are you organized, how is 
your content, how is your role as a team 
player. " 
PPP - access 
Discussions of how 
PPP has affected 
access  
These 5 codes 
include any 
discussion of the PPP 
policy. This includes 
how respondents 
defined PPP, the 
impact the policy has 
on access and 
quality, and 
discussions around 
joining the program 
"One, the numbers have gone up in a good 
way, and the children are very … the parents 
of the children are very good. They are smart, 
they look healthy, and the discipline is also 
very good." 
PPP - 
definition 
Descriptions of PPP 
as a policy, in general 
"Now that PPP, when they started USE, there 
were not enough government schools in 
place, especially when you look at urban 
areas, .(..) so what the government did, since 
it did not have enough schools, it partnered 
with some private schools so that we are 
willing to do that partnership, then you enroll 
the students, government comes and it 
monitors, at least it monitors your staff, the 
infrastructure, the quality, and they can assist 
you apart from that 47 000, they sometimes 
give you instructional materials, like they 
have given us textbooks, basic ones for o-
level" 
PPP - grant 
money 
Discussions of PPP 
grants, what they are 
used for and their 
frequency 
"One thing that has been a problem is that 
sometimes remittance of even the USE funds 
come sometimes late. " 
PPP - joining 
decision 
Description of the 
process to apply for 
PPP by the school.  
"Now, I told you that when I was beginning 
here, I began it as a charity, I even wrote to 
organizations like “Books of the World” that 
used to send me books. Then I Saw that I 
could not manage catering for the students, 
catering for the teachers. I used to tell the 
parents, just bring small money that we can 
use to cater for the teachers. Then when 
government brought in this system, I mean 
policy, then I said no, it can assist. So from 
there I Said let me just write, so I wrote to 
the town council informing them. I have been 
assisting these children, I want you to 
support me so that I join USE, so that we can 
cater for these boys and girls." 
  
 
PPP - quality 
Discussions of how 
PPP has affected 
quality  
"Like I’ve already said, if I am able to get 
more facilitation, and use that facilitation to 
develop the school, then eventually the final 
product should come out better, as 
compared to if I hadn’t gotten that 
facilitation." 
School 
Description - 
General 
Description of the 
school 
This code includes 
any general 
description of the 
school such as its 
history, enrollment, 
etc. 
"This school is a Catholic based school. It 
started in 2000. It has existed for almost 14 
years. It's basically, a private school. It's a 
mixed school for both boys and girls. We 
have just acquired USE. That's Universal 
Secondary Education. It's now four years in 
place. We have also got the center number. It 
is now three years old." 
Students - PLE 
Mentions of PLE 
scores 
This code includes all 
mentions of Primary 
Leaving Exam scores. 
"Yes, from aggregate 4 to 28. That is 
government support. Then after that, we tell 
whoever comes having aggregate above 28, 
we tell them government does not cater for 
them, but again those who come with above 
28, for us we subsidize here" 
Students - S1 
selection 
Descriptions of S1 
application or 
selection process 
This code includes 
any discussion of the 
enrollment and 
selection process 
"Yes, we accept all of them up to fourth 
division. That is 32. " 
Students - sent 
home 
Discussions of 
students being sent 
home for school fees 
This code includes all 
mentions of students 
being sent home. 
"You call the parents, you send the student 
home, but obviously, when exams come, you 
have to relieve them, waiting until the end of 
the year" 
Students - SES 
Description of SES of 
students  
This codes includes 
discussions of 
student socio-
economic status and 
poverty related 
factors 
"Yeah, it can happen, because some of our 
students are economically crippled. You look 
at somebody wearing even the way… if 
someone can manage to come to school even 
minus lunch, so you wonder if they have to 
pay fees what can happen." 
USE - access 
Discussions of how 
USE has affected 
access  
These 3 codes 
include any 
discussion the USE 
policy. This includes 
how respondents 
defined USE the 
impact the policy has 
on access and quality 
and whether this has 
impacted the 
community or 
country 
"What the policy basically did is it increased 
enrollment in secondary schools. " 
USE - 
definition 
Descriptions of USE 
as a policy, in general 
"Truly, truly, this USE is a positive policy. 
When I am talking about it as a head teacher, 
I don’t know what happens beyond the 
whatever, whatever happens beyond the 
school. But this one is in two dimensions. 
Either the government has a school that it 
funds and the students that attend that 
school are all paid for by government. Leave 
alone the fact that the money paid cannot 
cover every other aspect or activity in the 
  
 
school, but many children here would not 
have got secondary education, end up 
making it to school." 
USE - quality 
Discussions of how 
USE has affected 
quality  
"The quality, sometimes is compromised in 
the purely government institutions. Parents 
are looking for quality, they often don’t find it 
in the government." 
 
 
  
  
 
Appendix F – Econometric Models 
 
Adapted from Barrera-Osorio et al. (2016) 
 
 
Results from the quantitative study come from an ITT model based on two main 
specifications. In the first model, the outcome variables (Y, enrollment and test scores) are 
regressed against a dummy variable indicating random assignment to treatment (T, 1=treatment; 
0=control).  
 
𝑌𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑠,𝑡 + 𝐵𝑋𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑠,𝑡     (1) 
 
Outcome variable Y included enrollment as well as student test results of individual i in 
school s at time t. Enrollment was measured as the total number of students enrolled in a 
particular grade. Test results were standardized with respect to the control group (mean zero 
and standard deviation of 1). The regression was run at school or student level, according to the 
outcome measure. X included control variables measured at baseline. Standard errors were 
clustered at the school level. All regressions include region fixed effects.   
 
The second main specification is similar to the first equation. In this second equation, the 
dependent variable Z includes three families of potential channels of school change.  
𝑍𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑠,𝑡 + 𝐵𝑋𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖,𝑠,𝑡   (2) 
 
The dependent variable Z includes changes in school inputs (teacher characteristics and 
school infrastructure), changes in the school governance, and changes in the characteristics of 
students. 
 
In order to test quantitatively the data that emerged from the qualitative work, an ITT model 
was used in the same way a priori mechanisms were tested. 
  
  
 
Appendix G – Results Tables from Barrera-Osorio et al. (2016) 
 
This Appendix includes tables from Barrera-Osorio et al. (2016) reporting the quantitative 
findings of the impact of PPP on enrollment (table 5), student learning (table 6), school 
governance (table 7), inputs (table 8) and student composition (table 9).  
 
 
Table 5. Impact on enrollment: treatment versus control
Check 1 Check 2 Check 3 Check 1 Check 2 Check 3
Log (Total number of students) 0.285* 0.320** 0.288* 0.903* 0.978** 0.737*
(0.16) (0.14) (0.15) (0.47) (0.42) (0.39) 
Log (Students, grade 1) 0.451*** 0.410*** 0.295* 1.436*** 1.251*** 0.750*
(0.17) (0.15) (0.17) (0.52) (0.44) (0.42) 
Log (Students, grade 2) 0.084 0.134 0.459** 0.276 0.408 1.225***
(0.18) (0.16) (0.17) (0.51) (0.45) (0.47) 
Log (Students, grade 3) 0.282 0.259* 0.071 0.723 0.791* 0.19
(0.18) (0.15) (0.18) (0.51) (0.47) (0.45) 
Log (Students, grade 4) 0.371 0.410* 0.143 1.028 1.253* 0.306
(0.24) (0.22) (0.16) (0.69) (0.65) (0.41) 
Log (Students, grade 5) 0.177 0.353 0.395 0.681 1.076 0.965
(0.32) (0.31) (0.32) (0.85) (0.86) (0.77) 
Log (Students, grade 6) 0.12 0.319 0.273 0.489 0.974 0.673
(0.32) (0.31) (0.31) (0.86) (0.86) (0.72) 
Log (Female students, grade 1) 0.504*** 0.439*** 0.27 1.612*** 1.339*** 0.672
(0.17) (0.15) (0.18) (0.57) (0.49) (0.45) 
Log (Female students, grade 2) 0.089 0.224 0.485*** 0.285 0.684 1.285***
(0.18) (0.17) (0.16) (0.51) (0.50) (0.46) 
Log (Female students, grade 3) 0.307* 0.310** 0.121 0.848 0.945* 0.33
(0.18) (0.16) (0.18) (0.53) (0.49) (0.47) 
Log (Female students, grade 4) 0.358 0.398* 0.097 0.985* 1.216** 0.195
(0.22) (0.21) (0.17) (0.60) (0.60) (0.44) 
Log (Female students, grade 5) 0.214 0.247 0.379 0.757 0.755 0.934
(0.25) (0.23) (0.24) (0.67) (0.64) (0.58) 
Log (Female students, grade 6) 0.119 0.24 0.272 0.444 0.732 0.669
(0.23) (0.22) (0.24) (0.63) (0.63) (0.56) 
Regions FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Baseline Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of schools 94 93 94 92 93 89
OLS IV
Note. Each number represent the estimated coefficient of regressing each enrollment outcome (in natural 
logarithm) against treatment status. All regressions controls for region fixed effects and baseline characteristics. 
IV Estimation: reports coefficients of the second stage (2SLS) regression, where the first state regress actual 
transfer (as reported in Check 2) as a function of treatment status. 
  
 
  
  
 
 
Table 7. Changes in the schools: governance
Control Mean 
and SD
Treatment-
Control
Control Mean 
and SD
Treatment-
Control
Control Mean 
and SD
Treatment-
Control
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Presence of BOG 0.94 -0.074 0.96 -0.09 0.93 -0.037
(0.24) (0.06) (0.21) (0.06) (0.25) (0.06) 
BOG meets seldom 0.51 -0.027 0.55 -0.038 0.44 0.055
(0.51) (0.13) (0.50) (0.13) (0.50) (0.13) 
BOG discusses infrastructure 0.53 0.241* 0.62 0.026 0.71 -0.358**
(0.51) (0.14) (0.49) (0.14) (0.46) (0.14) 
BOG discusses teacher motivation 0.38 0.102 0.46 0.022 0.39 0.313**
(0.49) (0.14) (0.51) (0.15) (0.50) (0.14) 
Perce of BOG members absent last 0.21 0.027 0.24 0.023 0.18 0.026
(0.17) (0.04) (0.21) (0.06) (0.11) (0.03) 
Ownership change 0.02 0.021 0.07 -0.015 0 0.038
(0.14) (0.05) (0.25) (0.06) (0.00) (0.04) 
Max. Number of observations 48 96 46 93 46 95
Region Fixed effects and baseline controls Yes Yes Yes
Check 1 Check 2 Check 3
Note. Columns (1) include the mean and SD for each variable for the control group. Columns (2) present the coefficient of the regression of 
each variable of governance against treatment status. All regression controls for baseline characteristics and fixed effects at the region level. 
  
 
  
Table 8. Changes in the schools: teachers and  infraestructure
Control Mean 
and SD
Treatment-
Control
Control Mean 
and SD
Treatment-
Control
Control Mean 
and SD
Treatment-
Control
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
A. Teachers
Number of teachers 15.27 0.986 17.04 2.521 22.02 -0.689
(4.12) (1.02) (4.61) (1.81) (11.08) (1.85) 
Percent female 0.19 0.01 0.19 0.012 0.21 -0.026
(0.11) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.10) (0.02) 
Percent permanent 0.64 0.039 0.63 0.015 0.58 -0.029
(0.23) (0.05) (0.20) (0.04) (0.19) (0.04) 
Percent in class 0.22 0.069* 0.22 0.074** 0.23 0.031
(0.15) (0.04) (0.13) (0.03) (0.12) (0.03) 
Percent absent 0.29 -0.083 0.28 -0.004 0.31 -0.028
(0.26) (0.05) (0.20) (0.04) (0.20) (0.04) 
Percent with secondary or lower 0.09 -0.033 0.06 0.085**
(0.16) (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) 
B. Infraestructure
Students per chair, grade 1 2.2 -0.033 2.36 -0.234 2.14 0.082
(1.45) (0.33) (2.51) (0.44) (0.92) (0.21) 
Students per chair, grade 2 2.07 -0.331 1.81 -0.043 2.26 -0.215
(1.27) (0.24) (0.88) (0.19) (1.05) (0.24) 
Index of class: condition, noice, clean 7.72 0.226 7.67 0.161 8.01 0.057
(1.46) (0.31) (1.39) (0.30) (1.44) (0.29) 
Library (yes or no) 0.26 0.129 0.38 -0.064
(0.44) (0.10) (0.49) (0.11) 
Number of working toilets 7.2 1.277 7.15 -0.109
(5.38) (1.20) (6.26) (1.33) 
Laboratory 0.67 0.199** 0.57 0.215*
(0.47) (0.10) (0.50) (0.11) 
Index of instruments (lab) 6.46 0.323 8.44 0.089
(3.48) (0.72) (1.42) (0.33) 
Max. Number of observations 48 96 46 93 47 95
Control (baseline and region fixed ef.) Yes Yes Yes
Check 1 Check 2 Check 3
Note. Columns (1) include the mean and SD for each variable for the control group. Columns (2) present the coefficient of the 
regression of each variable against treatment status. All regression controls for baseline characteristics and fixed effects at the region 
level. 
  
 
Table 9. Impact on S2 student composition
Control Mean 
and SD
Treatment-
Control
Treatment-
Control
(1) (2) (3)
A. Characteristics of Students: Demographics
Students' age 16.15 -0.449** -0.281**
(1.81) (0.18) (0.14) 
Gender (1 male) 0.5 -0.024 -0.017
(0.50) (0.03) (0.03) 
B. Characteristics of Students: Education
Inverse PLE Score (4=lowest; 36=highest) 17.72 1.046* 1.227**
(5.51) (0.57) (0.58) 
Absence, last week 0.47 -0.068* -0.075**
(0.50) (0.04) (0.04) 
Repeated a grade 0.46 0.027 0.026
(0.50) (0.06) (0.05) 
Walks to school 0.88 -0.017 -0.012
(0.33) (0.03) (0.03) 
Help on homework 3.04 0.029 0.014
(1.23) (0.12) (0.12) 
Hhold visits school 0.63 0.113*** 0.108***
(0.48) (0.03) (0.03) 
C. Characteristics of Students: Household
Hhold Assets 2.31 0.118 0.037
(1.06) (0.11) (0.09) 
Hhold service 2.6 0.041 -0.016
(0.83) (0.09) (0.07) 
Hhold size 9.32 -0.765** -0.887***
(4.80) (0.37) (0.32) 
Mother's education 2.79 0.2 0.105
(1.36) (0.12) (0.10) 
Father's education 3.37 0.297** 0.220*
(1.44) (0.12) (0.12) 
D. School characteristics according to student
Answered question 0.95 -0.014 -0.01
(0.22) (0.02) (0.02) 
Noise in classroom 0.44 0.013 0.016
(0.50) (0.05) (0.05) 
Shares desk 2.16 0.037 0.005
(0.90) (0.12) (0.13) 
Fixed Effects Region level No Yes
Number of obs. 585 1299 1299
Test for jointly significance
Chi2 39.816
Prob>Chi2 0.001
Check 3
Note. Column (1) report mean and standard deviation for the control group. Columns 
(2) and (3) report the estimate of effects of a regression of  each outcome variable 
against the treatment indicator, controlling for regional fixed effects.  Standard errors 
are cluster at the school level. 
  
 
 
Appendix H – Interview and Focus Group Participants 
 
 
School ID Participant ID Pseudonym Role Gender 
01 P01_1 Maria Head Teacher Female 
02 P02_1 Patrick Head Teacher Male 
02 P02_2 John Parent Male 
02 P02_3 Betty Parent Female 
02 P02_4 -14 Parent Female 
03 P03_1 Robert Head Teacher Male 
04 P04_1 - Head Teacher Male 
05 P05_1 Suleiman Owner Male 
05 P05_2 Fatima Head Teacher Female 
05 P05_3 Ibrahim Guardian Male 
05 P05_4 Amina Guardian Female 
06 P06_1 Paul Deputy Head 
Teacher 
Male 
06 P06_2 - Parent Male 
06 P06_2 - Parent Male 
07 P07_1 Kennedy Head Teacher Male 
07 P07_2 James Parent Male 
07 P07_3 Alvin Guardian Male 
07 P07_4 - Parent Male 
08 P08_1 Oliver Owner Male 
08 P08_2 Clare Parent Female 
08 P08_3 Peter Parent Male 
08 P08_4 - Guardian Male 
08 P08_5 Valentine Parent Female 
09 P09_1 - Head Teacher Male 
09 P09_2 John Parent Male 
09 P09_3 Samson Parent  Female 
09 P09_4 - Parent Male 
10 P10_1 Daniel Head Teacher Male 
10 P10_2 Robert Parent Male 
10 P10_3 - Parent Male 
11 P11_1 - Head Teacher Male 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 For ease of reference, only interview participants quoted in this paper are given a pseudonym. 
